There have been many reasons offered for the (re)turn to ethical issues in literary criticism and theory (and, indeed, in the humanities generally) since the late 1980s and early 1990s-for example, the need to get beyond the brilliant but, in the judgment of many, limited insights of deconstruction; or the opportunity to build on the underlying ethical appeals of politically engaged critical approaches such as feminism and critical race theory; or the general move to interdisciplinarity that helped make philosopher Martha Nussbaum's case for narrative as a site for ethical inquiry such an appealing one.
In this essay, however, I want both to advance a different case for the ethical turn in narrative studies and to consider some of its consequences as I reflect on how my ethical relation to two narratives in the British tradition has developed over time. The case is simply that, for multiple reasons, including but not limited to the ones mentioned above, the academy has shown a readiness to acknowledge explicitly what it had often previously acknowledged implicitly-namely, that narratives, like our lives, in general are saturated with ethical considerations. The validity of this assertion rests on the fact that stories constitute one of human beings' primal strategies for organizing into meaningful patterns the otherwise overwhelming data of the world. World-data comes to human beings basically disorganized, self-contradictory, and chaotic. It is useless to us in its raw state. We can only use data when it is patterned, and while human beings employ many strategies for imposing pattern on the world's chaotic data-scientific hypotheses, religious interpretations, social conventions, social science studies, historical analysis, intellectual concepts, philosophical inquiries, and so on-it is stories more than any other strategy-specifically, it is stories' ethical visions-that pattern the world into meaningful shapes.
Marshall Gregory
A story's ethical vision is a particular configuration of rights and wrongs that it puts in motion within a represented human context. The ethical vision of a story operates in the same way that it does in our lives: it is foundational to our sense that we can live a flourishing life, or that we must live with danger, deprivation, discomfort, or injustice. The ethical vision of a story is its power to capture the valences of all those rights and wrongs that operate at the core of our everyday existence. The ethical vision of both persons and stories includes all of those actions, thoughts, motives, and attitudes which we feel that we and others ought to do or ought not to do, and it includes the ethical criteria by which we judge ourselves and others to be good or not good. The core of everyone's everyday existence just is a set of ethical considerations.
This kind of ethical discourse seems not only embarrassing to some people (sounds like Sunday School talk?), but to many academics and professionals it also seems intellectually primitive. That's because it is intellectually primitive. But that doesn't mean it's unimportant. Academic readers and professional critics to whom "intellectually primitive" is as noxious as road kill need to remember that the primal issues in human beings' lives are always the most important issues-and are always unavoidable, in any event. Ethical considerations are primitive elements in our social life the same way that the medulla oblongata is a primitive part of the brain. We don't use the medulla oblongata for doing calculus, but if it isn't doing its job we have no breath or pulse to do calculus with. Ethical considerations have this kind of primal importance for us.
Ethical considerations infiltrate every human interaction not because we don't try hard enough to filter them out but because there is no filtering them out. Depending on how we answer ethical questions about how others are treating us and how we should treat them, nothing less is at stake than the minute-by-minute, overall, everyday quality of our lives. As moral philosopher Robert Louden says, Moral considerations have ultimate importance not (as many philosophers have argued) because they form a tightly packaged set of interests that can be shown to logically "override" all other competing sets of interests but rather because they concern values to which the pursuit of any and all interests, including scientific and technical ones, must answer. Morality is not just one narrow point of view competing against others. . . . [Its] ultimate importance is [a function of its] pervasiveness. Moral considerations literally appear able to pervade or permeate . . . more areas and aspects of human life and action (and once they gain entry, to have, somehow, the final word) than do any other kinds of considerations. . . .
. . . All aspects of human life over which we exercise at least some degree of voluntary control have indirect moral relevance. . . .
. . . Morality's fundamental importance stems not from its "standing above" everything else but rather from the fact that it literally surrounds everything else, lies underneath everything else, and is continually embedded in everything else. (20; 59; 80) Ethical issues are a fundamental and distinctive part of human interactions because human actions are imagined and chosen rather than programmed and dictated.
Whether we are being treated fairly, sympathetically, compassionately, generously, kindly, honestly, respectfully, and so on are not discretionary issues for us, nor are they ever trivial. As long as any human interaction might be given a different character because I might choose another action, tone of voice, set of words, kind of body language, kind of eye contact, sort of gesture, imagined forecast of the interaction, and so on-and such choices, after all, pertain to all human interactions, even to the interactions between a guard and a prisoner in solitary confinement-then ethical considerations will not only be present in the interaction but also will constitute the most important determinant of the interaction's quality, not in some abstract sense but as concretely experienced by the participants. We seldom ask whether we continue to breathe but of course our breathing is continuous. So is our involvement with ethical issues.
Does this sound like an exaggeration? Perhaps you think that big issues that on their face have no obvious ethical significance-accidents, for example, or disease, talents, and luck-have as much or even more to do with the texture and quality of everyday life as human interactions with their inevitable ethical baggage. There is a sense in which you are right, but there are two things that must be kept in mind. First, accidents, luck, talents, and disease may set the circumstances of people's lives but people's reactions to these circumstances are more determinative of the quality of life than the circumstances themselves, as evinced by the fact that some people who suffer catastrophic debilitation from accident or disease maintain a high quality of life while others do not. If the circumstances were everything, these differences could not exist.
Second, human existence is so deeply rooted in ethical considerations that people cultivate ethical interpretations even about ethically neutral events. It's hard to believe that catching a cold or winning the lottery possesses any ethical significance, but a person's typical response to catching a cold is to assign agency and blame. "Damn. I'll bet I caught this cold from that person who sneezed in my direction at the faculty lunch table last Wednesday" (ethical significance: that person is treating me unfairly by being careless with his cold germs). Most people who win the lottery cannot help feeling that their success requires a deeper explanation than blind odds. Lottery winners seem unable to keep themselves from feeling that some agentGod, Lady Luck (as opposed to blind luck), dead Grandma's spirit, Providence, life itself, or whatever-is rewarding them (ethical significance: someone or something cares about my needs; someone wants to see me well off).
Because in contemporary America the traditional language of ethical discourse has largely been replaced with vocabulary from psychology, economics, sociology, and politics, people may not always be aware of the extent to which they are engaging in ethical talk and making ethical judgments, even when such talk and such judgments are the heart of the matter for them. But underneath non-ethical vocabulary lie ethical issues. When an acquaintance unexpectedly humiliates you with ridicule, you may offer a typical kind of pop psychology explanation ("Mark's loveless childhood set him up for lashing out at people"), but what you are outraged about is ethics, not psychology: "Mark's hostile ridicule of me was so unfair, so mean-spirited, so unkind, so ungenerous, so uncharitable!" When your spouse leaves your artist garret home to run off with a rich heart surgeon, you may offer a typical kind of pop economic explanation ("Mercenary women favor rich men, not starving artists"), but what you are outraged about is ethics, not economics: "Susan's dumping me for that fat rat's-ass doctor was so dishonest, so self-indulgent, so selfish, so callous, so cruel!"
There are many interesting and important issues about narratives not explained by this line of argument, but what it does explain is the use we make of narratives. Narratives exert influence on human ethos by holding up models for conduct and attitude, by guiding our responses to various human predicaments, by scripting the various moral and ethical judgments that we might make about other people's behavior, and so on. But such influence only finds the entryway to the human heart in the first place because narrative consumers-all of us-actively rush forward to fling open the door. It's simple: stories influence us because we so intensely and persistently-indeed, ceaselessly-desire the kinds of interactions with them that cannot help influencing us.
The kinds of interactions I mean are the interactions that carry educational value for how to deal with life's conundrums, perplexities, ambitions, motives, attitudes, actions, explanations, feelings, values, ideas, and human types. Even people who think about none of these things at a conscious level remain persistent consumers of stories-no other single activity, perhaps, marks the human species quite as distinctively as this one-and it seems fair to surmise that all of us, even the most thoughtless, possess the intuition that life itself cannot offer us all the education we need in order to grapple with its complexities. 1 We live too briefly, most of us only dream in one language, most of us are intimately conversant with only one culture, none of us can switch sexes or race-and-ethnic-identities at will, none of us can live in times past, and all of us are limited to occupying a single spot of space and time at a time. How can life itself, which for most human beings everywhere is comparatively narrow and dominated by routine, 2 give us an education about its typical predicaments, permutations, and puzzles that is truly broad?
Thus every culture uses stories to fill in the gaps, and those gaps manifest themselves as a kind of hunger for experience wider and different from the routines of everyday life, a hunger that everyday life can never fill (see Gregory, "Humanism's Heat," "Sound of Story"). Narratives and their ethical visions constitute the best education we can receive in making judgments about other people and about ourselves because narratives and their visions take us inside a vaster range of human circumstances than we could ever encounter in first-hand experience. As Sidney said so long ago, "poetry hath [ever] been the first light-giver to ignorance" (83). But a story's ethical vision enlightens our ignorance by giving us more than mere description. The real problem of life for human beings is not deciding on the one "right" description because we can live quite comfortably in the presence of many and vast descriptive errors. You can live as complete and happy a life thinking that the world is flat as you can knowing that it's round. But if you cannot read other people's ethical dispositions-if you cannot tell whether other people are prone to help you or harm you, deceive you or tell you the truth, hate you or love you, be kind or unkind to you, be generous or stingy with you, and so on-then it won't matter if you think your world is flat or round because it will just be a mess. The real problem in life is knowing how to judge things, and this is a problem that, over and over, narratives' ethical visions help us answer.
But how each of us learns from individual narratives is itself a complicated process, one that sometimes is carried out over many years and many readings, and that therefore can be worthy of its own narrative. In what follows, I will explore my ongoing ethical engagement with two narratives, Charles Dickens's David Copperfield and Emily Brontë's Wuthering Heights, as case studies in how we learn from the ethical visions of narratives. My claim is not that all readers will or should respond to these novels as I have done but that my experience offers one version of a more general phenomenon that I believe other readers will recognize. My personal narrative about narrative engagement paints a picture of how anyone's engagement with a story can involve, and probably will involve, a complex interaction between the reader's personal situation and an author's ethical vision.
3 Over time this interaction may be an ongoing activity. It is certainly not a once-and-for-all thing like a brass casting. An ongoing interaction with any narrative may mean that sometimes one is especially open to the story's ethical vision, but that at other times one may be especially susceptible to misreading that vision or seeing it only through a glass darkly. My story illustrates several facets of this general phenomenon.
ETHICAL VISION IN DAVID COPPERFIELD
AND ITS USEFULNESS TO ME Many of Dickens's most passionate readers first discovered him when they were children but I did not, and my personal relationship with David Copperfield is in part a consequence of the fact that I did not discover Dickens's novels until I was a twenty-four-year-old graduate student at the University of Chicago. In a bright Chicago autumn in a class taught by the great scholar, Morton Dauwen Zabel, I discovered the banquet table of Dickens's novels and devoured one after another as rapidly as I could. I strode around the tiny married student apartment that my wife and I lived in as I read to the walls the speeches from different characters, laughing my head off at Vincent Crummles's story of the circus pony in Nicholas Nickleby whose mother, says Crummles, "ate apple-pie at a circus for upwards of fourteen years, and went to bed in a nightcap; and, in short, took the low comedy entirely" (286); being brought nearly to tears in Little Dorrit over the sadness of Arthur Clennam's childhood, which Clennam remembers as "a legion of Sundays, all days of unserviceable bitterness and mortification, slowly passing before him" (30); or raging bitterly with the narrator against the callous neglect of the poor as the narrator of Bleak House responds to Jo's death with his thunderous denunciation, "Dead, your Majesty. Dead, my lords and gentlemen. Dead, Right Reverends and Wrong Reverends of every order. Dead, men and women, born with Heavenly compassion in your hearts. And dying thus around us every day" (649).
"Naïve responses," you say? "Unprofessional responses," you snort? Yes, they are. I plead guilty-but unrepentant-on both counts. My responses were naïve and unprofessional because they were not responses I cooked up for the sake of looking good in Zabel's class or for the sake of teaching my own Dickens classes later. (As for having responses that I might later publish in articles, at that time I would have considered this to be no more likely than flying to Never Land with Peter Pan or writing the Great American Novel on the back of a napkin.) My responses, naïve and raw, came directly from the heart of Dickens's ethical visions to my own heart, which was intensely hungry for an ethical vision of life more deep, generous, compassionate, humane, thoughtful, connected, and nourishing than the ethical vision of Protestant fundamentalism foisted on me and the other members of my family by my narcissistic, son-demeaning, supercilious, and frequently violent father. Since my discovery of Dickens's novels during that autumn of 1964, the components of Dickens's ethical vision have woven themselves like living threads into the warp and woof of my life. They form an active part of my personal history in the way that digested food provides the energy with which I move, or in the way that, for any of us, deeply internalized convictions about the importance of family or religion or country or justice or whatever generate a distinctive way of seeing and interpreting the world. And the Dickens novel that has had the greatest effect on me is David Copperfield.
At the heart of David Copperfield lies an ethical vision of nurturing vs. destructive relations between children and adults: an ethical vision of how some kinds of child/adult relations create the foundations for human flourishing, and how others create weakness, self-absorption, self-loathing, and stymied development. When I first read the novel, I especially vibrated in sympathy to the way the history of my own young life mirrored the history of Davy's young life, primarily because my own father shared many characteristics with Mr. Murdstone. My own Murdstone father was egotistical, tyrannical, and rigid; he had a short fuse that could explode into sudden violence mostly directed at me and nearly always delivered behind the mask of self-righteous, pious ideologies like "spare the rod and spoil the child," "discipline is good for the soul," and the most infuriating piety of all, "this hurts me worse than it hurts you." 4 David Copperfield's description of the character assumed by both his new stepfather and his odious sister, Miss Murdstone, also describes my own father: "Firmness, I may observe, was the grand quality on which both Mrs. and Miss Murdstone took their stand. However I might have expressed my comprehension of it at that time, if I had been called upon, I nevertheless did clearly comprehend in my own way, that it was another name for tyranny; and for a certain gloomy, arrogant, devil's humor, that was in them both. The creed . . . was this. Mr. Murdstone was firm; nobody in his world was to be as firm as Mr. Murdstone; nobody else in his world was to be firm at all, for everybody was to be bent to his firmness" (49).
It was also the case that my own mother, like Davy's, was fearful, weak, easily dominated, and weepily ineffectual-a world-class expert at living in withdrawal and denial-and thus offered me no protection from my father. At the age of twentyfour, when I first read David Copperfield, I had not processed-indeed, I was still at that time refusing even to see-the bruising dynamics of having been raised in a family of highlight-reel dysfunctionality. But you can doubtless imagine how warmly and sympathetically I responded to Davy's childhood sufferings at the hands of the cold, demanding, implacable, and sometimes violent Mr. Murdstone. I never bit the hand that caned me-my father actually preferred using tree switches and belts-but even though I was in my twenties when I first encountered Davy biting Mr. Murdstone's hand, I received a major jolt of vicarious pleasure in the payback.
The value of such vicarious experience, however, surely lies not in the enjoyment of petty paybacks. If the only consequence of my reading about Davy biting Murdstone were petty enjoyment in the payback, I'm sure that I would have soon outgrown the novel. Surely the value of this narrative experience for me, and, presumably, for others, lies not in its cementing of petty emotions but in its invitation to claim a deepened understanding of both my past and present.
Even at the unreflective age of twenty-four, I could see in Davy's life certain consequences of being raised under tyranny that I was having a hard time seeing in my own life-namely, the way a tyrannized child tends to respond both too uncritically and too eagerly (for his own good) to any crumb of support and sympathy from an outside source, as Davy responds too eagerly and loyally to Steerforth's careless and manly but elegant attentions.
5 I could see in Davy's case that the no-nonsense support of Betsy Trotwood, who expected reciprocal support from Davy, made Davy a better person than he would have been had he received the kind of compensation for childhood suffering that every suffering child wants: unlimited sympathy. But I could only see these things, of course, because they were there to be seen in something outside of myself, because they form part of the ethical vision of Dickens's novel. Seeing the history of David Copperfield's relationship to Mr. Murdstone helped me place my relationship with my own father before me as an object to be apprehended and thought about, not just felt. I don't want to overstate the case and say that the scales fell from my eyes on my first reading, but the novel affected me deeply, and in so doing it helped prepare me to see that relationship more objectively.
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A relevant distinction here (and an additional point) is a distinction between ethical models that we might wish to emulate vs. ethical models that assist or enrich our understanding. Davy's biting attack on Murdstone decidedly did not give me a useful model to emulate. Davy's hand-biting did not make me wish to bite my father's hand, and biting it would not have solved anything if I had done so. Reading that scene did, however, prepare me to understand better some of my childish resentments and also my childish tendency, even in young adulthood, to unwittingly exaggerate the extent of my father's power and authority over both me and others.
Two other passages generated by this novel's ethical vision have carried great weight for me, both when I first read them and throughout my forty years of David Copperfield rereadings. My relationship to these two passages has been changing and variable, more like the dynamic relationship one has with a lifelong friend than the static relationship one has with an inanimate object (see Booth, Company, "'The Way'"). The passage early in the novel in which young Davy portrays himself in his tiny attic bedroom, reading and rereading the delightful cache of novels that he has discovered there as a kind of secret legacy from his dead father struck me with great force because it so mirrored my own youthful reading of novels. In the chapter called "I Fall Into Disgrace," which is a condition into which both Davy and I were frequently cast by our father figures (and a condition that goes far to explain why we both spent much solitary time in our rooms reading), Davy describes himself in the following passage, which I have considerably shortened:
My father had left a small collection of books in a little room upstairs, to which I had access. . . . From that blessed little room, Roderick Random, Peregrine Pickle, Humphrey Clinker, Tom Jones, the Vicar of Wakefield, Don Quixote, Gil Blas, and Robinson Crusoe, came out, a glorious host, to keep me company. . . . It is curious to me how I could ever have consoled myself under my small troubles (which were great troubles to me), by impersonating my favorite characters in them-as I did. . . . I have been Tom Jones . . . for a week together. I have sustained my own idea of Roderick Random for a month at a stretch, I verily believe . . . and for days and days I can remember to have gone about my region of our house, armed with the centerpiece out of an old set of boot-trees-the perfect realization of Captain Somebody, of the Royal British Navy, in danger of being beset by savages, and resolved to sell his life at a great price. . . . When I think of it, the picture always rises in my mind of a summer evening, the boys at play in the churchyard, and I sitting on my bed, reading as if for life. (55-56) I, too, as a boy, spent a good deal of time roaming the areas where my family lived, usually rural areas, pretending I was a character from one of my latest-read novels. At the time I first read the "reading as if for life" passage, I
had not yet dealt with the painful truths of my upbringing. But the image of young Davy escaping from family troubles and trying to avoid further disgrace by retreating into a world of imagination and second-hand experiences elicited from me a warm and sympathetic, although a fairly mushy and muddled response. My reaction was partly formed, I believe now, out of unacknowledged self-pity and a sense of kinship with any young child to whom reading was not only a means of escaping a forbidding and frightening father figure but indulging in a private pleasure beyond anyone else's dismissal or contempt. Now, however, many years later, this "reading as if for life" passage is still important to me. Instead of evoking a vague dissatisfaction with my lot and awakening in me a childish self-pity about my abusive upbringing, though, it evokes for me the satisfying realization that my youthful reading, no matter what unhappy pressures may have been partly responsible for it, ultimately yielded more benefits and advantages for me than almost anything else I have ever done, second only in importance and benefits to the wife and daughters who grace my life. I can look back now on "reading as if for life" and think, "yes, I did read not merely as if for life but in a way that has made reading a way of life in itself. I have kept on reading for life and can't imagine another or a better one." I read myself out of a miserable home, into college and graduate school, into a profession that suits my talents and inclinations, into much of the world's greatest literature, and into sustaining scholarly work that keeps my mind and spirit alive, and I continue to read myself into challenging and interesting relationships with my students. Ultimately, but not soon, I hope to read myself into a contented retirement. Whether I shall die, as Tennyson is said to have died, lying across a moon-drenched bed with an open copy of Cymbeline by his side, I cannot say, but such a demise would have a certain appropriateness to an existence spent "reading as if for life."
The second passage I want to discuss has greatly assisted me over the years in that pursuit that all of us work at-gaining a sense of stable personal identity (see Eldridge, Eakin, and Ricoeur). The opening sentence of David Copperfield-"whether I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life, or whether that station will be held by anybody else, these pages must show" (1)-has been a touchstone for me in times of confusion and uncertainty, helping me return to a clearer and more purposeful sense of myself. It has played this role in my life because it plays this role in the ethical vision of the novel, which is nothing if not an ethical vision of how David Copperfield becomes an autonomous and self-cognizant moral agent instead of the frightened lump of self-pitying weakness that he was programmed to be.
But children such as Davy Copperfield and I don't easily discover or travel the path to autonomous agency. For many years "whether I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life or not" nearly haunted me. I knew intuitively that it did not refer merely to masculine daring-firing the torpedoes, winning the game, or saving the child-but referred instead to something more like internal integrity, self-direction, and self-knowledge. I knew that being the hero of my own life meant believing that I could become something like a "best version" of myself despite not having been properly loved as a child. But I also knew intuitively, and this intuition troubled me greatly, that I could not be the hero of my own life unless I broke free from the diminishing consequences of forever "falling into disgrace."
One of the many dangers of being an unloved and powerless child is a developmental resistance to personal agency, a resistance to personal responsibility. Those who were unloved children tend never to see failures as their own fault but as the fault of those who should have cared for them more and loved them better. Unloved and powerless children have great trouble embracing the truth that being unloved does not let them off the hook for being responsible agents in the world. They tend to think at the very least that the trade-off for suffering ought to be not being held responsible. They never say it to themselves this plainly, but it's one of the temptations that suffering children are likely to fall for every time. I wanted agency for the obvious reason that autonomy is a superior form of life to slavery, but I resisted it because it meant not only that I would have to become responsible for my own life but also that I would have to give up nursing my childish angers and resentments. For some children these angers and resentments can become lifelong habits of the heart.
Bakhtin's analysis of novelistic discourse offers a useful model for the kind of ongoing relationship with a novel that I am describing here. Bakhtin's conception of the dialogic relationship among multiple voices within novels invites an analogy to the dialogic relationship that can develop between novels and their readers over time. In Bakhtin's words, The way in which the word conceptualizes its object is a complex act . . . and into this complex play of light and shadow the word enters. . . . If we imagine the intention of such a word, that is, its directionality toward the object, in the form of a ray of light, then the living and unrepeatable play of colors and light on the facets of the image that it constructs can be explained as the spectral dispersion of the ray-word . . . in an atmosphere filled with the alien words, value judgments and accents through which the ray passes on its way toward the object; the social atmosphere of the word, the atmosphere that surrounds the object, makes the facets of the image sparkle. (277) Adapting this image so that the object becomes the reader and the word becomes the novel-but preserving Bakhtin's insight into the nature of dialogic interaction-captures the sense of my own historical relationship with the ethical vision of David Copperfield. This work, this novel-as-word, entered my life like a ray and established a dynamic relationship with something alien to it, something not itself-that is, my consciousness and the facts and conditions of my life-such that I, as the object of the word, came under the influence not of a passive word but of an interactive discourse, what Bakhtin calls "the spectral dispersion of the ray-word." Dickens's ethical vision of what it might mean to "become the hero of my own life" threw light on my ambition, my deep impulse, to liberate myself from Murdstone-like oppression. Along with other influences, the light of ethical vision in David Copperfield-asword helped me see the possibilities of my own life in a new way, and in helping my seeing it assisted my becoming. Among other agents in our lives, story is a kind of midwife to character, but, unlike physical birth, character is always being born, shaped out of the ongoing choices we make. As an ongoing thing of emergence, then, rather than a one-time thing of fixity, character is susceptible to enduring dialogical relationships with a great many influences, including stories, as David Copperfield has been to me.
Having said this, however, you can see the extent to which personal circumstances play a role in the dialogical relationship that readers have with stories. For me the relationship with my father acts as a kind of lens that focuses hard on certain representations in David Copperfield-namely, Davy's relationship with Murdstone. But it is easy to imagine that other readers might respond differently. For example, women might have typical experiences of females in a patriarchal society that focus them not on Dickens's depth of psychological insight into Murdstone's sadism but on his shallowness of psychological insight into the possibilities for female fulfillment. I can imagine that many if not most women could not be happy having to choose between the clichéd silliness of Dora Spenlow and the clichéd saintliness of Agnes Wakefield.
THE ETHICAL VISION OF WUTHERING HEIGHTS AND ITS LIMITATIONS
In contrast to the instant bond I felt with the ethical vision of Dickens's novels, I have had an up-and-down relationship with the ethical vision at the heart of Wuthering Heights, and it is precisely this history of up-and-down interactions that makes an account of my relations with this narrative useful to the present discussion. This history demonstrates in a different way than my interactions with Dickens's novels do that as consumers of stories our perception of the ethical vision of narratives is always tied to our personal, biographical, historically situated, ethical vision of life itself. We cannot engage with any narrative apart from who we have been, who we are now, what we know, what we want, and what insights our techniques of reading, listening, or viewing can yield. The following discussion focuses primarily on who I was when I first read Wuthering Heights and who I was when I engaged in subsequent rereadings of this novel at different points in time, and how the differences in who I was at each point both influenced my reading and was influenced by my reading.
I first read Wuthering Heights when I was in high school, deeply steeped in all of my family's dysfunctional turbulence. Then I read it again in college, where my budding intellectual development and my distance from home allowed me to read the novel less pressured by family dynamics. I read Wuthering Heights again in graduate school, where my reading was driven primarily by growing skills of technical analysis, especially narrative technique, and this change in reading technique led me to a total reevaluation of the novel's ethical vision.
7 Then I reread the novel as recently as spring 2004, thirty-five years after graduate school, in preparation for writing this essay.
Only my last and most recent rereading of Wuthering Heights occurred at a far distant time and in a vastly different psychic space from my confrontation with my family's deep dysfunctionality. This painful confrontation had occurred when I was thirty, had finished my Ph.D., had finished the first three years of my professional career, and had just experienced the thrill of my first daughter's birth, which was the catalytic event that led me, finally, to face my family's sad and sordid pathologies. Each planetary tilt of my responses to Wuthering Heights has been produced by an interactive dynamic between the gravitational pull of the novel's ethical vision and my own ethical quest for autonomy and self-knowledge as I orbited around it.
MY HIGH SCHOOL READING: HEATHCLIFF AND THE ETHIC OF POWER
In my powerlessness and lack of individual agency in high school, at age fifteen, what most attracted me about the ethical vision of Wuthering Heights was Heathcliff's power, or, more precisely, his rise to power from an early position of abuse and deprivation. Heathcliff in his youth was precisely all the things that I was when I first encountered him in the pages of Brontë's novel. He was psychologically battered and physically beaten, unappreciated and treated unfairly, with no one to turn to for redress (after the death of old Mr. Earnshaw). After Heathcliff left Wuthering Heights and returned to it a few years later as a man, however, he showed that he had become all the things that I was not and that, in truth, I could not at that time even imagine becoming. Heathcliff as a man was independent, certainly, but most of all he was powerful, powerful enough to place himself beyond the injustice and pain inflicted on him by those who had delighted to mistreat him when he was young.
Most significant of all, Heathcliff generated the energy and the means for his rise to power-somehow-out of his own internal resources. For neither Heathcliff nor for me was there a deus ex machina in the form of King, God, Saint George, magistrate, or the Cheeryble brothers-I could not even expect my mother to act as my second, much less as my savior-to help us out or to right our wrongs. But unlike me, Heathcliff tapped sources of internal power and righted his wrongs for himself, a possibility that was for me highly charged with feelings. I took care (unconsciously) not to identify these feelings to myself with any precision, for I had good reason to know in my relations with my father, as Heathcliff knew in his relations with Hindley, that it was dangerous to give out either verbal or physical expressions of rebellion. But underneath the level of conscious expression-in those murky regions of the human heart where nascent intentions are often disguised by the smoke of passion-Heathcliff's ethic of power fed my rising spirit of rebellion.
There were many facets of Heathcliff's ethical character that in this first, early reading of Wuthering Heights I simply failed to take into account. The facts, for example, that Heathcliff uses his power not merely to protect himself from other's abuse but to seek revenge (and to seek it in out-of-scale ways); that Heathcliff shows profound disrespect for others by his willingness to use them as tools; that Heathcliff takes out his spite on innocent creatures like Isabella's spaniel, whom he hangs, and on Catherine Linton, who is not entirely innocent but who has never wronged Heathcliff in any way that merits the hatred he bears her; that Heathcliff cruelly enjoys inflicting pain; that Heathcliff is willing to sacrifice by force others' happiness, not to mention their very well-being, to serve his avarice; and that Heathcliff is not only deficient in charity but also is totally devoid of charity, fellow-feeling, generosity, civility, and compassion not just toward anyone who ever wronged him, not just toward anyone who is innocently associated with anyone who ever wronged him, but to anyone who has never wronged him, such as Lockwood.
The abused, deprived, and needy frame of mind in which I read Wuthering Heights when I was fifteen prevented me from seeing these facts in their proper light. I was made uncomfortable by them but I hurried over them, squeezed them into the background of my attention. Because I was so tightly riveted to the spectacle of Heathcliff's rise to power, I failed to see the totality of his character, even though the data about Heathcliff's character is clearly laid out in the text. In trying to save Isabella from certain misery in forming an attachment to Heathcliff, Catherine Earnshaw says clearly-and as the only person who loves Heathcliff her condemnation carries both veracity and force-that Isabella must not "imagine that [Heathcliff] conceals depths of benevolence and affection beneath a stern exterior! He's not a rough diamond . . . he's a fierce, pitiless, wolfish man" (89-90). On the other hand, it is a curious feature of this novel's ethical vision as mediated by a skillful narrative technique that I and all other readers of Wuthering Heights are invited, despite the explicitness of Catherine's characterization and Heathcliff's own actions, to make, if not an incomplete assessment of Heathcliff's character, as I did, then a more ethically benign assessment than the novel's own evidence, viewed merely as data, calls for. 9 But more is at stake than an interesting narrative technique. Brontë succeeds in using her narrative technique in the service of her ethical vision. She succeeds in getting the reader to recognize what Heathcliff's character really is but at the same time to give that recognition less weight than it would deserve in any strict moral ac-counting. As a youthful reader I was wrong to focus so narrowly on Heathcliff's rise to power, wrong for letting the lens of my life obscure my clear view of the novel's own data. But Emily Brontë plays a calculating game as narrator in making that misreading easier for me than if she had given her readers the ethical skinny about Heathcliff's character in a more straightforward manner.
But of course Brontë is right not to do so. She's my novelist, not my moral babysitter, and as long as she doesn't deliberately contradict the terms of her own representation (which she doesn't), what she achieves by means of her novel's ethical vision of complex rights and wrongs is a multilayered portrayal of the multidimensional context in which ethical character emerges and in which ethical judgments are generated. She shows clearly that the interplay between ethical character and ethical judgments is messy, complicated, always susceptible to corruption from the play of self-interest, and highly prone to error because of human beings' limited ability to draw correct ethical inferences from others' concrete conduct. But she also shows equally clearly that nothing is more important than sustaining an energetic effort, despite its difficulties, to get it right: to understand what ethical character is and to see clearly the criteria by which to judge it.
MY COLLEGE READING OF WUTHERING HEIGHTS:
EMBARRASSING CREDULITY ABOUT NELLY When in my third year of college I read Wuthering Heights again, my increased skills of analytical reading led me to see Heathcliff's villainy of character more clearly than I had before. The more I thought about Heathcliff in this new light, the more it became apparent to me that he did not represent the kind of power I wanted for fending off my father's injustices. Now I saw Heathcliff's wolfish pitilessness as just another picture of my father. Since even in my abused youth I longed for power primarily as a means of self-protection, not self-aggrandizement, my now-clearer view of Heathcliff's villainy led me as a reader to a highly uncritical acceptance of the only person in the novel who persistently articulates explicit judgments against Heathcliff's character: Nelly Dean. As a college reader I was still allowing the dynamics of my troubled family relations to guide my reading of Wuthering Heights in ways that blinded me. What I failed to see on this second reading, of course, was all the evidence that Nelly Dean is often an unreliable narrator and is always a self-serving narrator. As I attempted in my college reading to correct my high school fascination with Heathcliff's power by now distancing myself from his villainy, I used Nelly's platitudinous judgments as my means of doing so.
I cringe to admit that Nelly's platitudes became my platitudes. When Nelly smugly tells readers that "I went about my household duties, convinced that the Grange had but one sensible soul in its walls, and that lodged in my body," my toocredulous college-reader-self (mea culpa!) believed her (103). And when she returns a pious cliché to one of young Heathcliff's many asseverations that he will one day work his revenge on Hindley-"'For shame, Heathcliff!,' said I. 'It is for God to punish wicked people; we should learn to forgive'" (57)-I took her to be prescrib-ing civilized and sensible medicine for the cure of Heathcliff's bitterness. On the face of it this is what Nelly is doing, of course, but prescribing generic medicine that fails to take the patient's circumstances into realistic account is not actually a help. It's just moralizing for the sake of moralizing.
But there are instances when Nelly's judgments are sufficiently shrewd, insightful, and ethically satisfying that inattentive or inexperienced readers such as I was in college can be lulled into lowering their critical guard and taking everything else that Nelly says at face value, including her sentimental elevation of all the novel's "nice" characters and her exaggerated depreciation of the "not nice" characters. Inattentive readers can also be led to accept the persistently self-serving commentary that Nelly uses to justify the way she controls the flow of domestic information in her employers' homes. Acting as a kind of information gatekeeper, Nelly sometimes deletes information, sometimes alters it, almost always spins it, and sometimes just makes it up. But despite these questionable ethical practices-questionable on the ethical fronts of honesty, respect, integrity, compassion, and sometimes just plain kindness-Nelly buys a vast deal of credit for herself with the few arrows of criticism that fly dead center to her target, as when she deftly delivers a slitty-eyed rejoinder to Catherine's complaint that she is always having to baby Edgar's and Isabella's feelings. Nelly shoots back, "'You're mistaken,' Mrs. Linton,' said I. 'They humor you. . . . You can well afford to indulge their passing whims, as long as their business is to anticipate all your desires'" (86). Readers who delight in the dead-on accuracy of this insight, and a few others that Brontë strategically salts throughout her tale, are tempted to view all other insights by Nelly as having equal authority. The only problem is, they don't all have equal authority. I simply failed to see this fact in my college-level reading of Wuthering Heights.
MY GRAD SCHOOL READING OF WUTHERING HEIGHTS:
WHIPLASH JUDGMENTS ABOUT NELLY When I reread Wuthering Heights in graduate school, however, I nearly gave myself intellectual whiplash from the force of my rebound interpretation of Nelly Dean's status as an ethical judge and commentator. Having developed my reading skills exponentially since college, and having just read Wayne Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction, as well as having taken classes in literary criticism from Booth, Ronald Crane, and Elder Olson, I walked to the batter's box on my next rereading of Wuthering Heights fully prepared not to swing at any sucker pitches. Nelly Dean, stuck with her script, threw all of the same explanations and judgments that had sailed right by me in earlier years like those low and inside pitches that hitters who like high outside balls never see. Now, however, armed with all kinds of major league skills for hitting spit ball pitchers who try to slide platitudinous, unreliable curve balls over my narrative plate, I knocked poor Nelly off the pitching mound by line-driving all her meddling, dishonest, trimmed, shaved, and trumped-up information right back at her.
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As you can doubtless infer, I certainly felt intellectually virtuous and highly professional in having learned how to do this sort of reading, but I had an even greater problem with Wuthering Heights's ethical vision than I did with Nelly Dean as narrator. I especially disliked what I perceived-and continue to perceive-as the novel's championing of an ethical vision that favors undisciplined, rampant romanticism: a configuration of rights and wrongs that asks readers to admire intensity of feeling for its own sake, no matter how self-indulgent or irrational or harmful, and that asks readers to be fascinated with near-mad emotionalism as if such emotional extremity constituted a self-evidently higher mode of existence than everyday soberness and judicious thought.
Wuthering Heights honors not just fiercely intense emotions but fiercely intense emotionalism, a state of being in which one is addicted to extreme emotions in the same way that Duke Orsino is a man addicted to being in love with love. This kind of emotionalism for its own sake was all too similar to the anti-intellectual emotionalism of the Protestant fundamentalism I had been raised in, and I knew all too well how easily it could be used as a mask for limitless forms of self-aggrandizement, selfishness, and cruelty. When Heathcliff makes histrionic utterances such as "The moment [Catherine's] regard ceased [for Linton], I would have torn his heart out, and drank his blood!" or "[Linton] couldn't love as much in eighty years as I could in a day" (125-26), I'm convinced that all readers are supposed to feel that the energy, the vigor, the masculine power, and the brutal assertion of self-interest so honestly portrayed here is a good thing-or at least a good thing in comparison with the mealy-mouthed Linton. Heathcliff's contempt for Linton seems to be Brontë's contempt as well, the product of an ethical vision all aswoon over romantic intensity. The novel's over-the-top melodrama ethically repelled me even in my graduate school days. Catherine's violent response to Edgar's anger about Heathcliff is a good example: "There she lay dashing her head against the arm of the sofa, and grinding her teeth, so that you might fancy she would crash them to splinters!" "Good," was my reaction, "I hope she hits wood and knocks some sense into her head." I was even unhappier with the novel's rip-off of Ophelia's mad scene in which she distributes the flowers to the Elsinore courtiers, 11 and the later rip-off of Keats's "Ode To a Nightingale." 12 If I could feel that Brontë was using these rip-offs to satirize excessive and irrational emotionalism, I might have grounds for appreciating their deft appropriateness in revealing Catherine's character. But it seemed to me then-and still seems to me now-that Brontë uses these rip-offs not to satirize the characters themselves but to show that Catherine and Heathcliff, despite their social and psychological pathologies, nevertheless enjoy a more intense and therefore superior kind of existence to everyone else.
Nothing separates the ethical vision of Brontë's ersatz, immature romanticism from the ethical vision of mature romanticism better than the fact that near the end of his "Ode To a Nightingale"-which is indeed a poetic discourse about escaping bodily constraints and living in some golden realm where bodies do not shatter and feelings do not shred-Keats is enough of a hard-headed realist to accept facts rather than indulge in fantasies. "The fancy cannot cheat so well" (l. 73), he admits. The fancy, in other words, cannot provide real escape from the built-in conditions of human existence. In the end the bird's song that throughout the poem has symbolized a transcendent realm of escape from the mundane simply goes away-"Adieu! adieu! thy plaintive anthem fades" (l. 75)-leaving human beings positioned where they are always positioned: forced to negotiate their existence in the context of a thousand competing desires and conditions but never escaping their muddled, mixed state as creatures of contraries innumerable. If Keats's and Brontë's lives are measured by conventional markers of suffering and deprivation, they both had powerful reasons to indulge themselves in the longing that we all sometimes have to believe in a transcendent realm where bodies do not "grow pale, and specter-thin, and die" (l. 26), a line from "Ode To a Nightingale" that Keats wrote soon after having nursed his brother Tom through the final stages of tuberculosis. Keats, however, at the end of his poem and, from what evidence remains, at the end of his life as well, stuck to basic facts about life rather than indulge himself in escapist fantasies.
If an ethical vision either in a narrative or in a life serves any concrete end at all, it provides the resources for making or not making the kind of call that Brontë's ethical vision avoids and that Keats's ethical vision embraces. Brontë seems intent on ordering the rights and wrongs of her fictional world in such a way that, at least for Heathcliff and Catherine, escape really is possible. In the end Brontë tries to pass off this bogus notion to her readers, initially through Lockwood's vision of Catherine's ghost at the beginning of the novel, and subsequently through Heathcliff's visions of that same ghost as he becomes more and more distractedly entangled with it, such that he can neither eat nor sleep, until he dies, at which point he and Catherine are joined together, presumably, forever.
Yawn. This is an ethic of escapism, not an ethic of generosity, kindness, selfcontrol, honesty, or compassion. In short, it is not an ethic that has anything to do with ethics as principles to which we might appeal for assistance in living a deliberate life in which, at the very least, we do no harm, or a life in which, at the most, we might actually make life for us and our companions better than it would otherwise be. This is a humble enough ethical vision, to be sure-there's nothing grandly heroic about doing no harm or trying to create the conditions in everyday life that encourage human flourishing. But who can deny that an ethical vision based on honesty, fairness, kindness, self-control, generosity, and compassion would make the world more hospitable to human happiness than the ethic of Wuthering Heights, which honors the selfish assertion of fiercely intense emotionalism above all other human qualities?
REREADING WUTHERING HEIGHTS AFTER THIRTY YEARS: COMING TO TERMS But perhaps Brontë is more subtle than I have thought all these years. Perhaps she is not simply out to honor the selfish assertion of fiercely intense emotionalism but is, in fact, after larger, different, and more interesting game. 13 An alternative way of understanding the ethical vision of Wuthering Heights is to see it as a critique of middle-class power, niceties, sentimentality, and, above all, hypocrisy. Viewed in this way, the ethical vision of Wuthering Heights positions Thrushcross Grange as a kind of miniature kingdom dominated by middle-class values, one that exists in direct opposition to Wuthering Heights as a kind of miniature kingdom dominated by anti-middle-class values.
From this perspective both kingdoms are places where power matters most but where the typical power of each kingdom manifests itself in radically different ways. The power at Thrushcross Grange is socially legitimate, historically traditional, and massively patriarchal-God the father above all, King the "sire" above all subjects, men above women, husbands above wives, fathers above children, masters above servants. It is accompanied by all the behaviors that traditionally identify and reinforce middle-class power: going to church; getting educated; observing proprieties; paying lip service to the pieties; using a refined accent; dressing like other middle-class persons; observing expected gender roles; and, above all, sticking with class peers in all matters of tension, competition, or trouble between middle-class persons and the lower orders, especially about matters of sexual tension in which persons threaten to blur class lines by falling in love and getting married across class boundaries. This is a more interesting hypothesis about the ethical vision at the center of Wuthering Heights than my earlier hypothesis about rampant romanticism because it makes Brontë's ethical vision in support of the intense emotionalism at Wuthering Heights a means to an end, not an end in itself. From this perspective, Brontë's ethical vision is designed to make us see the corrupt ethics of middle-class power-typified by the configuration of rights and wrongs in the kingdom of Thrushcross Grange-for what it really is. Its end, in other words, is to expose a kind of velvethammer middle-class oppressiveness, and its means is to show us what that oppressiveness looks and sounds like when it drops the velvet hammer and picks up the ax and pitchfork, when oppressiveness asserts itself in the most raw, selfish, callous, undisciplined, unguarded, unfeeling, and unkind ways possible, which are the ways in which it typically expresses itself in the kingdom of Wuthering Heights.
Throughout her novel Brontë exerts persistent pressure on middle-class ideals and values. She keeps smashing at them the way Heathcliff smashes at the windows and locks of Thrushcross Grange, and Heathcliff and Catherine are her main smashing tools. Of Isabella, whose love for Heathcliff seems based on a middle-class achetype of the blunt-man-with-a-gruff-exterior-who-turns-out-to-be-honorableand-loving-underneath-the-surface, Heathcliff says, once Isabella's eyes are opened to reality, "I don't care who knows that the passion was wholly on one side, and I never told her a lie about it. She cannot accuse me of showing one little bit of deceitful softness" (127). His speech of contempt about Linton's love for Catherine is even more explicit in its attack on middle-class notions of decency, decorum, and rightness: "And that insipid, paltry creature attending [Catherine] from duty and humanity! From pity and charity! [Edgar] might as well plant an oak in a flowerpot, and expect it to thrive, as imagine he can restore [Catherine] to vigor in the soil of his shallow cares!" (129 emphasis original).
There's no middle-class gallantry and no middle-class niceness here, but there is an honesty of contempt. Surely Brontë is right to suggest that contempt is also present in many middle-class relations, only in those relations contempt is masked by middle-class charms, conventions, and well-bred smiles. If this is what Brontë hates, she does a good job of showing what its real nature looks like once its middleclass garb is removed and it stands naked before us in all of its self-interested ugliness. But if Brontë wants readers to infer that honestly expressed oppressiveness is to be preferred, especially on ethical grounds, over middle-class hypocritical oppressiveness, I can only say to her, "ask the victims whether it really matters or not." The distinction between middle-class modes of hypocritical oppression and honestly raw self-interested oppression is a nicety unimportant to victims.
But an ethical vision that only tears down what it hates cannot help us build up what we love. If Thrushcross Grange represents middle-class values and conduct and Wuthering Heights represents anti-middle-class values and conduct, what this ethical vision seems unable to comprehend is that an anti-middle-class ideology is not a program for living-or, if Brontë does comprehend it, she seems to have boxed herself in with a story that cannot go beyond it. If Brontë thinks, as she apparently does, that an anti-middle-class ideology can be substituted for a positive theory of life, then perhaps she has not departed very far, after all, from the romantic escapism that I earlier accused her of indulging in. Brontë has used Catherine and Heathcliff to critique middle-class hypocrisy but apparently has no view of how they might actually construct a positive life together in the mundane realm. The best life that Brontë seems to be able to offer them is that "bogus" life after death, which posits that they live for the remainder of eternity wandering the moors together. The ethical vision of Wuthering Heights expresses objections to human diminishment but includes no theory of human flourishing.
CONCLUSION
Is it fair to hold Brontë, or any other storyteller, to the criterion of advancing an ethical vision that includes "a theory of human flourishing"? Certainly not in any abstract, absolute, deductive sense. But it is certainly not unfair to point out in an inductive way that this story or that story does not include such an ethical vision-and that David Copperfield clearly does.
14 I have no desire to position Emily Brontë on some precise spot on some bogus continuum that runs from "lesser" storytellers up to "greater" ones. But it is legitimate for me to bare the grounds of my prejudice in favor of stories that have theories, so to speak, over those that merely have objections.
My prejudice rests on the fact that stories exert a primal pull on human beings' attention. Stories are as ubiquitous as air, they are coterminous with consciousness itself, and they are both the product and the fodder of imaginative activity. The deep connection between stories and human consciousness, stories and human perception, and stories and human understanding means that stories are incalculably more important than mere entertainment. They are above all useful to us as we try to position ourselves among all the possibilities of life that, once some of them are seized as choices, spur the actions that mold us into the persons we become. The philosopher Mary Midgley provides an insight about the origin of morals that might also explain the origin of our ethical engagement with stories. "If we ask what is the source of the authority of morals," she says, "we are not looking outward for a sanction from the rulers, or for a contract. We are looking inward for a need, for some psychological fact about us that makes it deeply distressing to us to live shapelessly, incoherently, discontinuously, meaninglessly-to live without standards" (153).
This means that, for me at least, I feel a profounder resonance with stories that include an ethical vision of how life might be put together than I feel with stories whose ethical visions limit themselves merely to attacking the failures of some other ethical vision. There were lots of things in Dickens's world that he objected to, and few writers could voice their objections with the same rhetorical force as Dickens. But Dickens's ethical vision, which in a single stroke bound my heart to his works in 1964 and which still binds me to them today, is not just his objections to Murdstone's cruelty, Steerforth's selfishness, and Uriah Heep's meanness, but also his theory about the kinds of human relations that make everyday life-the place where we all really live-not just bearable but joyful and productive.
Dickens, like Keats, ultimately tries to be a realist. He is certainly unrealistic in some ways, most notably in his limited understanding of romantic relations between young men and women, but his grasp of such ethical principles as justice, kindness, honesty, and compassion is both strong and sure. Dickens recognizes that goodness is not always refined, well-spoken, well-dressed, or well-read, and he even knows that goodness isn't immune from being comical and occasionally ridiculous. But he knows goodness vs. oppression and compassion vs. cruelty when he sees them, and he never longs for a transcendent realm of escape. His ethical vision asserts powerfully that the quality of people's lives is created not by the ideologies they applaud in the abstract but by the concrete ethical choices they make in their everyday treatment of each other at business, in the street, at table, and when they need help or are called upon to give help. And he knows how to contrast nourishing and productive ethical choices with those that are demeaning and destructive.
As Dickens's novels show and as Brontë's Wuthering Heights does not, we really can live better lives if we shape them in accordance to an ethical vision that encourages us to meet everyday standards of decency, honesty, justice, and compassion. The economic system of energy and values that Brontë depicts in Wuthering Heights suggests that life is too compressed, too thin, and too competitive ever to provide the resources for human flourishing. Once old Earnshaw brings Heathcliff home there isn't enough love to go around any more. Hindley and Cathy are placed outside the orbit of the old man's concern. No matter where we turn in this novel we see insufficiencies. Even the cold stone floors and drafty windows and dark walls repel all approaches of human softness and warmth. There is especially an insufficiency of primitive moral virtues and resources-concern, compassion, kindness, justice-such that everyone at Wuthering Heights grows up not only cold and lonely but stunted, deprived, manipulative, and misshapen.
But in real life these kinds of consequences are not determined by the huge abstractions that we like to blame (which has the dubious benefit of letting us off the hook for moral blame) such as the "forces of history" or "economic laws" or "the depravity of man." In real life our failures of ethical responsibility and sensitivity are created or avoided not by these huge abstractions but by the day-by-day, momentby-moment choices we make in our social and moral relations with each other. Dickens sees this. He knows that any attempt to see Murdstone as merely the product of original sin or as a product of the pressures of a commercial society or as a product of misguided Puritanism misses the fact that Murdstone could have behaved differently if he had been possessed of a different ethical vision of life, one that is clearly available to him because other people who are equally vulnerable to original sin and the pressures of a commercial society and misguided Puritanism do not behave as Murdstone behaves.
In analyzing the origin of pathologies in either fictional or in real-life persons, we may talk the language of politics, power, ethnicity, gender, race, class, economics, nationalism, tradition, custom, mores, and so on. All of this talk is highly relevant to an understanding of our circumstances as embodied, historically situated agents, but lying underneath these categories of circumstance are the deeper, more elemental particularities of our ethical vision of life. We may talk very little about our ethical vision of life but it nevertheless operates as the engine driving our conduct and spins out our evaluations and expectations of others' conduct. It's not that ethical visions are not embodied and historically situated-they are-but our ethical visions are not so much the products of history and culture as they are the elemental human orientations that make culture and history possible. 15 Dickens's ethical vision taps into rock-bottom human orientations. His vision is simple but goes deep, and for this reason I will always hold Dickens's works more closely to my heart than Brontë's works, though I want to emphasize that the point of ethical criticism is not to rank novelists and their novels on some simple scale but to engage in complex ways with the ethical visions they offer. In this regard, I have found many rewards over a forty-year period of reading and rereading Wuthering Heights because the struggle I have had in weighing its values over time has taught me to think productively about the very ideas I have discussed in this essay. I could never have written this essay without the education I have acquired in my rereadings of Wuthering Heights. I value the instructiveness of this engagement almost as much as I value the ways in which David Copperfield has been a touchstone for me.
For all of us a lifetime of engagements with the ethical visions of stories becomes a major component in the construction of our ethical vision of life. Engaging with new stories and reencountering old ones generates a dynamic composed of both energy and matter, desire and substance. The actions, attitudes, and judgments we see in stories become the actions, attitudes, and judgments we put together in life, and these, cumulatively considered, turn us into the persons we become. Surely this not only explains but justifies a deep concern to understand, compare, and evaluate stories' ethical visions. We weave together the stories in our life into a pattern that ultimately becomes the story of our life. Learning to understand, compare, and evaluate stories' ethical visions becomes a way to understand ourselves: not only who we are and what we want, but who we ought to be and what we should want. ENDNOTES 1. In an essay called "Literature as Equipment for Living," Kenneth Burke says that "[T]he main point is this: A work like Madame Bovary (or its homely American translation, Babbitt) is the strategic naming of a situation. It singles out a pattern of experience that is sufficiently representative of our social structure . . . for people to 'need a word for it' and to adopt an attitude toward it" (259 my emphasis). Burke goes on to say that "Art forms like 'tragedy' or 'comedy' or 'satire' would be treated as equipments for living that size up situations in various ways and in keeping with correspondingly various attitudes" (262).
2. The New York commuter who hops the subway on her way to Times Square every day to make a living is not much different in this regard from the Amazon hunter who takes his bow and poison-tipped arrows into the jungle every day to make a living. Both lives, and everyone else's as well, are mostly a matter of doing the same things over and over in the company of the same people every day.
3. For other recent accounts of professional rereading and personal reflection see Booth, Nussbaum, Nafisi, Lesser, Edmundson, and Graff.
4. I was the person my father hit but he fought with everyone. He was a not very successful Protestant minister (for reasons of personal pathology, not perverted theology), and as he fought with those persons in our churches' social and financial hierarchy who were most powerful, he always displayed the same mean bitterness, the same cold fury, and ultimately the same inevitable failure as the white trash father in Faulkner's "Barn Burning" who fought with his landed employers. 6. Claiming that literature helped me see things more clearly contradicts Plato's claim that imitations only confuse our hearts and muddle our thinking, but I think Plato is so often right in this claim that contradicting it requires justification. It won't do just to dismiss Plato as if his claim were always and on principle wrong. Plato sees clearly that much imitation-literature to us-does indeed invite us to think shallowly, self-interestedly, and unclearly about life. Who would argue that Broadway musicals, Disney movies, pornography, and most TV soap opera and sit-coms help us see life whole and see it more clearly? Plato was dead right-even though he didn't have All My Children or Andrew Lloyd Webber musicals or The Little Mermaid to point to-to see that a lot of narratives pander to fantasy (in the worst sense of losing ourselves in ego wish-fulfillment), pride, ambition, and unearned fulfillments. Where Plato loses the best thrust of his argument is in its overextension, his assumption that there are no distinctions to be made between the clarifying representations of Homer and Sophocles on the one hand and the mindless poetry of repetition he hated on the other hand. Dickens helped me see my own life more clearly not by pandering to my self-pity but by showing me how David's defects of character are caused not solely by Mr. Murdstone but by David's maudlin self-pity, his tendency to try to compensate for the early deprivations of his childhood by an excessive emotionalism, and his excessive trust in self-styled authority figures. Dickens's representation of David Copperfield did not pander to my own excesses; it challenged them, and in doing so helped me see them more clearly.
7. Even here, however, right in the midst of my absorption in intellectual pursuits, ethical vision played an important role, for what was motivating my intellectual efforts more than anything else was my ethical vision of becoming not just intellectually accomplished but of becoming the kind of person that I thought described intellectually accomplished persons: wise, gracious, and benign. The fact that I was ludicrously wrong in my naïve assumption that most intellectually accomplished persons possess this kind of character doesn't diminish the ethical drive at the center of my ambition.
8. It speaks to the educational power of story in general to say that, in my view, the greatest contribution to my quest was made by story, not by desire. In the first place, to describe myself as engaged in a "quest for autonomy and self-knowledge" is not something I could have said before reading David Copperfield and Wuthering Heights but that I was closer to being able to say because of reading these novels. In the second place, while it would never be smart to underestimate the motivational power of human desire, the truth is that desire by itself, no matter how intense, doesn't necessarily produce progress or generate light. In order to grow toward autonomy and self-knowledge I needed more than desire. I needed ideas, concepts, images, and models-in short, I needed food for thought-in order to give my desire something to work with, and these I found in abundance in the novels I was reading. Food for thought is not self-generated out of desire.
9. Brontë skillfully pulls off this interesting, ethical sleight-of-hand primarily by employing two storytelling strategies that nearly always work when an author or movie or TV director wants to cement her audience's sympathy for any character at all but especially for a character of dubious ethical nature. First, just as Thackeray makes us sympathize with Becky Sharp during the first half of Vanity Fair, despite giving us plenty of evidence of her heartlessness-by showing Becky as comparatively better (in an ethical sense) than those around her, or at least as no worse (and a whole lot more entertaining)-Brontë works for the same kind of amelioration of judgment by surrounding Heathcliff with people who, especially in his youth, are clearly just as fierce, wolfish, and pitiless, if not more so, than Heathcliff himself. In his youth, moreover, Heathcliff's physical courage and his attachment to Catherine give him a better-seeming character, comparatively, than those around him. Second, Brontë coerces leniency of judgment from her audience towards Heathcliff, as authors and storytellers have been doing forever, by showing him wrongfully abused. The coercion of leniency is especially effective if the character shown as wrongfully abused is a child. Viewed as a logical matter of toting up the evidence for and against Heathcliff's character, Wuthering Heights gives its audience all the data it needs for seeing the wolfish and pitiless character whom Catherine accurately describes, but the fact that the two strategies I have just pointed to invite us to lean sympathetically in Heathcliff's direction allows Brontë to have her narrative cake and eat it too.
10. I delighted in my new ability to see that when Nelly asserts to Edgar that Heathcliff's return "will make a jubilee to [Catherine] "-next to which in the margins of my college text of Wuthering Heights I had written "an ill-considered statement"-Nelly was not making merely "an ill-considered statement" but was making mischief. I was pleased to catch Nelly making mischief again when she "related [to Edgar] the scene in the court, and . . . the whole subsequent dispute" (96). This is the dispute in which Heathcliff spits out to Catherine several insults about Edgar, including the violent threat that "every day I grow madder after sending [Edgar] to heaven!" (97). But when Catherine, distraught over Edgar's angry reaction to Heathcliff's threats, supposes that Edgar knows about Heathcliff's insults because he was eavesdropping on their conversation, Nelly does not confess that she has related this conversation to Linton. "What possessed [Edgar] to turn listener? [asks Catherine] Heathcliff's talk was outrageous . . . [but] had Edgar never gathered our conversation, he would never have been the worse for it" (97). The fact that Edgar had not, indeed, overheard that conversation but had been gratuitously told of it by Nelly Dean shows Nelly to be manipulative and self-serving in ways that are truly harmful to those around her. My graduate-reader-self was determined to find every such instance (of which there are many) and to bring Nelly to the bar of narrative and ethical judgment, where I intended to sentence her to the fullest extent allowed by the laws of literary criticism.
11. In the Ophelia rip-off scene, Catherine, having worked herself into a state of nearly mad distraction after the quarrel between Heathcliff and Edgar, tears open her pillow case with her teeth and then goes into a reverie-like cataloguing of the various birds' feathers that she now begins pulling from the pillow's insides. "That's a turkey's . . . and this is a wild-duck's; and this is a pigeon's. . . . And here is a moor-cock's; and this-I should know it among a thousand-is a lapwing's. . . . I made [Heathcliff] promise he'd never shoot a lapwing" (105). This is all so close a version of Ophelia's mad scene that it seems little more than an adaptation with the names of the characters changed and birds' feathers substituted for Ophelia's flowers. Ophelia enters: "There's rosemary, that's for remembrance. Pray, love, remember. And there's pansies; that's for thoughts. . . . There's fennel for you, and columbines. There's rue for you, and here's some for me. . . . There's a daisy. I would give you some violets, but
